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I N T E R V I S T E  
Conversation with Duncan Pritchard 
by Michel Croce 
 
Duncan Pritchard is Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh 
and Director of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre. He is certainly one of 
the most influential contemporary epistemologists. His main research inter-
ests include topics such as the problem of skepticism, the problem of the na-
ture and value of knowledge, extended knowledge, and social epistemology. 
He is author and co-author of several books, editor of the International 
Journal for the Study of Skepticism and Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, 
and principal investigator of several international research projects hosted 
at Eidyn. His latest book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the 
Groundlessness of Our Believing, published by Princeton University Press 
in 2015, provides a novel strategy to address the skeptical challenge. In this 
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broad interview, Pritchard reveals the theoretical origin of his latest work 
and illustrates the connections between the main topics he explored in his 
massive research activity. He also offers interesting anecdotes concerning 
his personal experience as an academic and insightful advices to those who 
are willing to pursue a philosophy curriculum. 
 
 
1. Dear Duncan, thank you very much for accepting my invitation to tell the 
readers of APhEx something about your work. We’ll have time to discuss in 
detail various aspects of your philosophy, but let me start with a brief bio-
graphical question about your interest in philosophy and in becoming an 
academic. If I recall correctly, you said you wanted to be an academic, even 
before deciding to start a degree in philosophy. Am I right? Can you tell us 
something about your professional dreams at that time? 
 
DP: Many thanks for the invitation Michel! 
Your memory is entirely correct. I must have been a very strange child, be-
cause from a very early age (6-7) I somehow formed the idea that I wanted 
to be a Professor. (I recall the teacher asking the class what we wanted to do 
when we grew up, and amidst all the usual answers – fireman, policewom-
an, train driver etc – there was my answer: “Professor”). This is particularly 
odd given that I don’t come from a background that would bring me into 
contact with Professors, or indeed even people with undergraduate degrees! 
In fact, I’m the first member of my family to go away to University. I think 
I liked the idea that a Professor was as high as it went in terms of your 
knowledge of a subject. I may also have had some vague idea about a “life 
of the mind”, and why this might be attractive (e.g., reading lots of books, as 
I loved books). Of course, I didn’t know what subject I wanted to be a Pro-
fessor of – that came later. 
 
2. What brought you to study Philosophy then?  
 
DP: At some point the general idea of being a Professor grew into the more 
specific idea of being a Professor of English Literature, and maybe also be-
ing a poet on the side (seriously!). I used to write a lot, and even won a few 
prizes for my writing (including one that was quite prestigious), so I thought 
I might well have the ability to both teach literature at a high level and also 
publish too. The way I got into Philosophy was pure luck. My original plan 
was to try to get into Oxford to study English Literature. But I was an unso-
phisticated and introverted boy (both are still true of me, alas) from a work-
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ing-class background and at a mediocre state school, so my chances were 
pretty slim. But then a wonderful opportunity presented itself. A part-time 
job that I had (and which I loved) looking after a local graveyard (mainly 
cutting the grass, but yes, sometimes digging graves too) looked to be 
morphing into a more full-time temporary role. The graveyard was very 
large, and in the middle of a very deprived area of Wolverhampton, near to 
where I grew up. Working part-time, I could only keep on top of some of 
the graveyard; the rest was completely overgrown. But the plan was to 
spend a year getting the whole graveyard under control, and of course once 
the jungle had been cut back it would be easier to maintain. The thinking 
was that this would be good for the area, and of course I was just the person 
to do it. This was going to solve lots of problems for me. I could take a year 
out and earn a decent wage, enough to finance a trip aboard at the end to do 
some travelling and make myself a little less unsophisticated. Plus, by tak-
ing a year out I could potentially get admitted to Oxford on grades alone, 
without having to do the interview (which I was dreading, as unlike pupils 
from private schools I would get absolutely no preparation). So far so good. 
But then the recession hit Wolverhampton. The factory where my father 
worked laid off most of its workers, him included, and my mother also lost 
her job as a school secretary. Worse, the funding for my position collapsed 
as well, so I was now looking at a year at home with me and my parents all 
out of work. (I got the grades I wanted by the way, and then some, as I took 
the so-called ‘special level’ exams for my subjects too – these were the old 
Oxbridge entrance papers, and to my knowledge I was the first person to 
take them at my school, at least as anyone could remember anyway – and I 
sailed through them as well. But all for naught as it turned out). In any case, 
I was now facing a crisis. Could I really face living a year in Wolverhamp-
ton with my parents and all of us on the dole (much as I love Wolverhamp-
ton – it’s one of the friendliest places around, for example – it is rather grey 
and depressing)? Anyway, then I remembered that our School had advised 
people to apply for University places even if they intended to take a year 
out, as one could always decline their place. Since I had no intention of go-
ing to University that year, I therefore had randomly chosen five northern 
Universities, and “accepted” the one that replied first, thinking that I would 
never go there. That turned out to be the University of Hull, and as it hap-
pened this was the only place where I had applied to do Philosophy and 
English Literature as a joint degree rather than just English Literature. So I 
was now faced with the prospect of a bleak year in Wolverhampton, or ac-
tually taking up this place at Hull. I thought about it for a while, and decided 
to give it a shot. It was an excellent decision. First, because Hull turned out 
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to be an amazing place. It’s a bit like Wolverhampton in fact, in that it is 
very friendly. But also because I was introduced to philosophy and realised 
that this was what I was born to do. Yes, I love literature, but what really 
gets me going is ideas, and I realised that it is the ideas in the literature that 
draw me in. By the end of the first year I converted to a single honours de-
gree in Philosophy, and never looked back. (Mind you, back then I was a 
“continental” philosopher, reading lots of Foucault, Deleuze, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and so on. I’m still interested in some of these figures as it hap-
pens, but these days I’m very much in the analytical mould). I thrived at 
Hull, and not just academically, as I also got to do other interesting things, 
such as edit the University newspaper, The Hullfire. In my final year I asked 
my dissertation supervisor, a very nice chap called T. S. Champlin, who the 
best analytical philosopher currently working in the UK was (the idea of go-
ing abroad never even occurred to me), and he said “Crispin Wright”. So I 
started reading Wright’s work, which was an eye-opener for me (especially 
as it was only in the second half of my degree that I really started to become 
converted to analytic philosophy). Suitably impressed, I applied to the Uni-
versity of St. Andrews, specifically to do my PhD under Crispin’s supervi-
sion (which was an excellent call).   
By the way, there’s a postscript to all this that I should mention, not 
least because it might encourage someone out there to give professional phi-
losophy a shot who might otherwise give it a wide berth. Given my modest 
background, and in particular the fact that I had absolutely no independent 
financial means (I worked my way through University), opting for a subject 
like philosophy was a hell of a risk. Remember that I’m the first person 
from my family to go away to University – I really should have opted for 
something with more job security! (Though being a poet is hardly better of 
course). But I reasoned that I owed it to myself to at least try it, and then 
further reasoned that if I was going to try it I had to go in 100%. I won’t lie: 
it was bloody difficult, and at one point had it not been for the financial help 
of a friend of mine, I would have had to quit. I realise in retrospect that I 
was very lucky to be doing a PhD around the time that British philosophy 
was starting to become more professional and meritorious (largely because 
of the RAE, now called the REF, that had been introduced to rate academic 
subject areas). This meant that no one really cared that much any more that I 
didn’t go to the right school (etc), but focused instead on what one had actu-
ally achieved. And I published early, and kept on publishing – that stood me 
in good stead, and it meant that I managed to get a decent (albeit temporary) 
academic position straight out of my PhD (cemented further by a grant I re-
ceived from the Leverhulme Trust, which helped me write Epistemic Luck). 
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Hard work, enthusiasm, and a general bloody-mindedness to refuse to even 
countenance the worst-case scenario (back to Wolverhampton with my tail 
between my legs?) did wonders for me back then. And of course the fact 
that I ended up being paid to do philosophy was incredible to me, and still 
is, to be frank. 
  
3.  Let’s go straight to the core of your research interests. Your philosophi-
cal output is impressive and covers many different areas of epistemology, 
but it’s easy to recognize that the problem of radical skepticism is the “fil 
rouge” of your reflections. You wrote about this topic in your first book, 
“Epistemic Luck” (2005, OUP), and you went back to the problem in your 
latest work, “Epistemic Angst” (2015, PUP). How do you conceive the 
skeptical threat? Why is it so hard to defeat the skeptic?  
 
DP: There’s a line in the new book, Epistemic Angst, where I say that the 
problem of radical scepticism, philosophically speaking, is both my first 
love and my true love. This is entirely true. It was encountering this problem 
that made me give up on the idea of being a published author/English Lit-
erature academic and focus instead on being a professional philosopher. The 
problem struck me as both deep and genuine. The former because I don’t 
think one can simply ignore it (see my answer to the question below for 
more details on this front), and the latter because standard answers to the 
problem are, in my view anyway, philosophically unsatisfying.  
I conceive of the sceptical threat as a paradox, since I think this takes 
the puzzle on its strongest formulation. If you take the sceptical threat as a 
position, such that there needs to be a consistent view known as scepticism 
that someone can advocate, then I think it becomes much too easy to defeat. 
Rather, what the sceptic does is demonstrate that there are claims that one is 
antecedently committed to, and which seem to be mere articles of com-
monsense, but which are, collectively, inconsistent. She then does nothing 
else, but merely backs away and watches you squirm at the realisation that 
you are committed a radical form of revisionism, whereby you need to deny 
something highly intuitive – though you know not what – in order to remove 
the contradiction.   
The reason why it’s so hard to defeat the sceptic (or, as I would prefer, 
“scepticism”, since there need be no sceptic on my view) took me a while to 
discern. (I genuinely struggled with this one, for many years). I argue that 
the key to the matter is to realise that what looks like a single problem is in 
fact two logically distinct problems that are generated by discrete philosoph-
ical sources. What is required is thus a response to radical scepticism that is 
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sensitive to these distinct philosophical sources of scepticism, and which in 
the process sees the sceptical problematic aright. This is what I call the bis-
copic treatment of the problem, in that we are seeing a dual-faceted problem 
through two eyes for the first time. (“Biscopic” is an ugly term, of course, 
and for a long time it was just a place-holder while I came up with a better 
term. But despite a lot of alternatives suggested by friends, I didn’t come 
across anything more suitable, and so this name stuck). The biscopic treat-
ment of the problem that I offer blends together two apparently competing 
anti-sceptical proposals: a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and episte-
mological disjunctivism (a view inspired by McDowell’s writings). I claim 
that, properly understood, these proposals are not competing at all, but ra-
ther complementary. Indeed, I argue that when combined they offer a com-
plete response to the problem of radical scepticism (of the kind that I am 
concerned with anyway; there are several sceptical problems), in that they 
enable us to deal with both aspects of this problem in a cohesive and mutu-
ally-supportive manner. Moreover, I claim that the reason why philosophers 
have hitherto been unconvinced by the anti-sceptical credentials of a Witt-
gensteinian hinge epistemology or epistemological disjunctivism is that they 
have assessed these proposals in isolation, which in fact they need to be as-
sessed collectively. 
 
4.  In your latest book you introduced a novel and extremely interesting vo-
cabulary for approaching the skeptical paradox. Can you explain what “ep-
istemic angst” and “epistemic vertigo” are in your view?  
 
DP: In previous work, such as Epistemic Luck, I used the term epistemic 
angst to refer to a general anxiety about one’s epistemic position that is gen-
erated by engagement with the sceptical problem. I now use it in a more re-
fined way to refer to an anxiety of this sort that is legitimately held. This en-
ables me to draw a distinction between epistemic angst and epistemic verti-
go. The latter is a residual anxiety about one’s epistemic position that one 
cannot shake even once one has discerned a philosophically satisfying re-
sponse to the sceptical problem (such that epistemic angst, understood along 
more narrow lines, is eliminated). What I wanted to capture was the fact that 
my particular response to the sceptical problem does not leave everything as 
it was (even though it is an undercutting response – i.e., it demonstrates that 
what looked like a genuine paradox is in fact nothing of the sort). In particu-
lar, the fact remains that although the sceptical problematic is shown to be 
illegitimate – in that it trades on dubious philosophical claims that should be 
rejected, rather than on mere commonsense – it is not as if in engaging with 
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the sceptical problem we can forget the inherent limitations of our epistemic 
position that it exposes; there is no return to a state of epistemic innocence. 
These limitations are not themselves a source for scepticism, as I explain in 
the book, but they are hidden from view in our everyday practices, which 
never fully engage with radical sceptical concerns. The upshot is that while 
those who have never been occupied with the sceptical problematic can 
rightly ignore it, those who have engaged with it will be left with an unnatu-
ral perspective on one’s epistemic position that is liable to generate this ves-
tigial anxiety, even though one is fully aware that the sceptical problem has 
been exposed as dubious. This is why I call it epistemic vertigo (or epistem-
ic acrophobia, if one wishes to be pedantic). The point is that when we at-
tempt a certain kind of philosophical perspective on our epistemic position – 
when we epistemically ascend, as it were – we can feel an anxiety about the 
security of our epistemic position even while being fully aware that there is 
no epistemic danger (not from radical scepticism anyway). Our reaction is 
thus in a sense phobic, just as one who is high up might fear falling even 
though she is fully aware that there is no risk of falling. (Epistemic vertigo 
is thus an alief, rather than a belief, to use Gendler’s useful terminology). I 
think it is important to capture this aspect of the phenomenology of our en-
gagement with scepticism, in order to show that not all epistemic anxiety is 
legitimate, even if it might be in a certain sense inevitable. (My approach to 
radical scepticism is broadly in line with Cavell’s on this score, in that I 
think the deep truth in scepticism is that our relationship to the world as a 
whole is not one of knowing. Our ordinary practices hide this point, a point 
which an engagement with scepticism reveals. But it is not itself a source of 
scepticism, properly understood, but merely an inevitable feature of what it 
is to be a knowing subject. Still, the “unnatural” philosophical perspective 
from which one recognises this point is dbound to bring with it the residual 
anxiety of epistemic vertigo).  
 
5.  I really like your approach, because it makes it clear that the skeptical 
threat challenges our epistemic and psychological states at the same time. 
Let’s dive into your analysis of radical skepticism. You distinguish between 
two distinct versions of skepticism, i.e. closure-based skepticism and under-
determination-based skepticism. What’s the difference between them? And 
why is so important to keep them distinct?        
 
DP: For a long time these formulations of the sceptical problem were taken 
to either be logically equivalent or else dialectically equivalent (in the sense 
that what logical differences there were, they didn’t matter to our dealings 
Michel Croce – Conversation with Duncan Pritchard 
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	     
  
with the sceptical problem). In an early paper of mine – «The Structure of 
Sceptical Arguments», Philosophical Quarterly (2005) – and in Epistemic 
Luck, I noted that in fact they are logically distinct sceptical arguments, to 
the extent that one could not expect that a response to the one problem 
would thereby be a response to the other (so in that sense they are not dia-
lectically equivalent either). I didn’t appreciate how important this result 
was at the time, but only came to see its significance later as I tried to work 
out how a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology might relate to epistemologi-
cal disjunctivism. As I came to recognise, these proposals were in fact en-
gaging with distinct sources of scepticism, each of which was associated 
with one of these formulations of the sceptical argument.  
In particular, it came to me that the sceptical appeal of the closure-
based sceptical argument trades on what I call the universality of rational 
evaluation. This is the idea that there are no in principle constraints on the 
extent of one’s scope of rational evaluations. This looks like a harmless 
claim, since why would there be any in principle constraints of this kind? 
(Of course there are practical constraints, like time, imagination, limited re-
sources, and so on). This idea crops up in the closure-based argument in 
terms of how it seems harmless to transition from everyday local rational 
evaluations to, via closure-style inferences, the kinds of wholesale rational 
evaluations that involve radical sceptical hypotheses.  
In contrast, the underdetermination-based sceptical argument trades on 
a distinct source of scepticism, what I refer to as the insularity of reasons 
thesis. This is the idea that the rational support we have for our knowledge, 
even in the very best case, is always compatible with our beliefs being mas-
sively in error. It is only with this claim in play that one can use the under-
determination principle to generate a sceptical conclusion.  
I argue that these two sources of scepticism are both completely distinct 
– in that one could reject/endorse the one without thereby being obliged to 
reject/endorse the other – and that despite their surface plausibility they are 
also both highly dubious. In particular, I maintain that they are not derived 
from our everyday epistemic practices, but are rather the result of question-
able philosophical theorising, and hence should be rejected. This is im-
portant since it enables us to construct an undercutting response to the prob-
lem of radical scepticism, one that contends that what looks like a genuine 
paradox is in fact nothing of the sort. In particular, we can respond to both 
the closure and underdetermination-based formulations of the sceptical 
problem without having to deny either of the epistemic principles in play. 
We are thus able to deal with the sceptical problem without having to resort 
to philosophical revisionism. This is only possible, however, because we 
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have differentiated these two approaches to radical scepticism and recog-
nised how they trade on distinct sources of scepticism. The key to the scep-
tical problem is thus to realise that it is in fact two problems in disguise, and 
as such requires the kind of biscopic treatment outlined above.  
 
6.  Now you have to tell us about your epistemological cure for the epistem-
ic angst. Which strategy do you adopt against the two forms of skepticism? 
 
DP: As noted above, I opt for a biscopic treatment of the problem, which is 
sensitive to the fact that this is in fact two logically distinct sceptical prob-
lems in disguise, which in turn trade on two distinct sources of scepticism.  
I argue that a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, properly understood, 
is the antidote to closure-based radical scepticism, in that it undercuts the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis. In a nutshell, what Wittgenstein 
demonstrates in On Certainty, I argue, is how it is a requirement of being a 
rational subject at all – i.e., someone who has beliefs, who can offer reasons 
in support of, or against, particular propositions, and so on – that one has a 
body of arational hinge commitments. As Wittgenstein emphasises time and 
again, it is a matter of logic that rational evaluation is structured in this way, 
such that it has these arational commitments at its heart. One consequence 
of this claim is that the very idea of a fully general rational evaluation – 
whether negative, as in the case of the sceptic, or positive, as in the case of 
the traditional anti-sceptic –is simply incoherent, since there could be no 
such thing. All rational evaluation is instead in its nature essentially local. 
(Note that this is not a limitation on our rational evaluations, any more than 
the fact that one cannot invent a circle-square is a limitation on one’s crea-
tivity). This means that it is the universality of rational evaluation thesis that 
is the joker in the pack in this regard, and must be rejected. Wittgenstein ex-
poses how this is in fact a philosophical fiction, one that is not rooted in our 
everyday epistemic practices at all. Crucially, however, I also claim that if 
we take Wittgenstein’s proposal seriously – and in particular embrace his 
claim that our hinge commitments are essentially “animal”, “visceral” and 
so on – then one can reject the universality of rational evaluation thesis 
without thereby having to deny the closure principle. We thus get an under-
cutting – and hence completely non-revisionist – response to closure-based 
radical scepticism. 
In contrast, I argue that epistemological disjunctivism, again properly 
understood, is the antidote to underdetermination-based radical scepticism. 
According to this proposal, in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge the 
rational support one’s belief enjoys can be factive, where this means that it 
Michel Croce – Conversation with Duncan Pritchard 
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	     
  
entails the proposition that it is rational support for. In particular, I claim 
that in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, one’s rational support for 
believing that p can be that one sees that p, where seeing that p entails p. 
Such a proposal has, until recently, simply found no home in contemporary 
epistemology, since it was widely accepted that if rational support was re-
flectively accessible then it couldn’t be factive (and, conversely, that if epis-
temic support was factive, then it couldn’t be reflectively accessible rational 
support). I argue that the philosophical reasons offered for rejecting episte-
mological disjunctivism are all highly dubious on closer inspection, and 
moreover that factive reflectively accessible reasons are rooted in our eve-
ryday epistemic practices. (Key to this argument is a distinction I draw be-
tween favouring versus discriminating epistemic support. I maintain that all 
epistemologists should endorse this distinction, but that it is particularly 
helpful for epistemological disjunctivism). It follows that our rejection of 
epistemological disjunctivism was based on faulty philosophical reasoning 
and hence that we should embrace our everyday practices that have factive 
reflectively accessible reasons at their heart. With such a picture in place, 
however, we are in a position to reject the insularity of reasons thesis – 
which is logically incompatible with epistemological disjunctivism – and 
hence undercut underdetermination-based radical scepticism. 
If one treats either of these proposals as being a single silver bullet to 
defeat radical scepticism, however, then they start to run into difficulties. A 
Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology has absolutely nothing to say about 
whether reasons can ever be factive, and as such it is silent about the insu-
larity of reasons thesis. But with underdetermination-based scepticism still 
in play, it can be hard to see how a response to radical scepticism that insists 
on the essential locality of rational evaluations is any comfort. Epistemolog-
ical disjunctivism, in contrast, can be applied to closure-based radical scep-
ticism – indeed, I had a go at this strategy in an earlier monograph, Episte-
mological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012) – but it gains an awkward pur-
chase, at best, on this formulation of the problem. For epistemological dis-
junctivism is now required to maintain not just that one can have rational 
support that decisively favours one’s everyday beliefs over incompatible al-
ternatives, but that one has, in addition, a factive rational basis for knowing 
the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. That claim is hard to stomach.  
But once one combines these proposals the difficulties that afflict each 
alone disappear. For one thing, notice that these theories are not competing 
anti-sceptical stances, as many have hitherto supposed, as they have very 
distinct domains of application. A hinge epistemology, properly understood, 
only tells us something interesting about the structure of rational evalua-
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tions, but it is entirely silent on whether, in particular, rational support can 
ever be factive. Epistemological disjunctivism, properly understood, is only 
a claim about a paradigm kind of knowledge (and possibly about paradigm 
cases of knowledge more generally, though that is an argument for another 
day), and not a thesis about knowledge in general. It is thus entirely compat-
ible with the idea that rational evaluations might be essentially local.  
These proposals are also mutually supporting when combined. It is eas-
ier to live with the idea of local rational evaluations if one can be assured, 
via epistemological disjunctivism, that there can be factive rational support 
(and hence that underdetermination-based radical scepticism is blocked). 
And it is easier to live with epistemological disjunctivism if it is not com-
mitted to there being factive rational support for the denials of radical scep-
tical hypotheses. But this is precisely one consequence of combining the 
views, since such a result is ruled-out by the fact that our commitments to 
the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses are hinge commitments.  
Finally, notice how both responses are entered in the same anti-
sceptical spirit, in that they are both undercutting responses to the problem. 
In particular, they both argue that what looks like a genuine paradox is in 
fact nothing of the sort, in that it in fact illicitly trades on dubious philosoph-
ical claims that should be rejected. We thus get a complete response to radi-
cal scepticism, one that is sensitive to its dual nature, and which offers an 
undercutting dual response as a result. Such are the advantages of taking a 
biscopic line on radical scepticism.  
 
7. I want to go back to your first book for a moment, to understand better 
how the problem of radical skepticism fits into the whole philosophical pic-
ture you built in these years. First of all, am I right if I say that “Epistemic 
Luck” contains the main ingredients of your epistemology? I want to men-
tion, among others: skepticism, Ludwig Wittgenstein, epistemic luck, and 
virtue epistemology. 
 
DP: Yes, I think that’s right, though I hadn’t realised at the time what a rich 
seam I was mining. (Had I realised this, the book probably wouldn’t have 
been quite so ambitious, and hence would probably not have had the influ-
ence it did. As Cate Elgin once memorably argued, there can be sometimes 
be an epistemic efficacy in being ignorant!). 
 
8. Can you tell us how you got to Epistemic Angst from Epistemic Luck? 
What is the main progress of the original view? 
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DP: My stance on radical scepticism has changed quite significantly, as I 
was never quite persuaded of the line I take in Epistemic Luck (though I still 
think I did a decent job of defending it). As noted above, although Epistemic 
Luck contains a discussion of the logical differences between closure-based 
and underdetermination-based radical scepticism, I didn’t appreciate at the 
time how important this point was to our understanding of the sceptical par-
adox. There are several other key ingredients that mark the transition from 
the first book to the most recent. One of them is my articulation of episte-
mological disjunctivism (e.g., in my 2012 Oxford UP monograph, Episte-
mological Disjunctivism). The other is the very specific non-belief rendering 
I now give of a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, which enables me to 
retain the closure principle. The third is an important distinction that I draw 
between favouring and discriminating epistemic support (see, e.g., «Rele-
vant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination», Noûs 
(2010)), and which underpins my argument for epistemological disjunc-
tivism. Finally, I also came to recognise that the project of analyzing 
knowledge and the project of dealing with radical scepticism are best kept 
apart (rather than run together, as I did in Epistemic Luck). Putting all these 
points together, one ends up with the biscopic treatment of radical scepti-
cism in Epistemic Angst. It took a long time to get there, but I got there in 
the end! 
 
9. Since we moved from specific questions to the broad picture, let me ask 
you also about your 2012 “Epistemological Disjunctivism”. You told us 
about this view as a component of your biscopic solution to radical skepti-
cism, but I want to understand better the scope of this project. Should we 
endorse epistemological disjunctivism only to account for perceptual 
knowledge? Or, do you think it’s plausible to be disjunctivist about other 
sources of knowledge? 
 
DP: Yes, my view – although I haven’t argued for this in print as yet – is 
that if epistemological disjunctivism is plausible then it ought to be general-
ly applicable to paradigm cases of knowledge, at least when that knowledge 
comes from core sources, such as perception, memory and so on. The focus 
on perceptual knowledge is merely because I think this is the cleanest case, 
and hence it’s the best case on which to mount a defence of epistemological 
disjunctivism as a viable position (bearing in mind that, until quite recently, 
the position was thought simply unavailable as a theoretical option by con-
temporary epistemologists). That said, it may well be enough as far as the 
sceptical problem that I am concerned with goes if only paradigmatic per-
Michel Croce – Conversation with Duncan Pritchard 
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	     
  
ceptual knowledge enjoys factive rational support. If that’s right, then the 
extension of epistemological disjunctivism to other kinds of knowledge 
need not carry any anti-sceptical load, even though it would be an epistemo-
logically important result.   
 
10.  Let’s talk about another important part of your work: the theory of 
knowledge that you named “anti-luck virtue epistemology”. As you explain 
in the first investigation of “The Nature and Value of Knowledge” (2010, 
OUP), your account challenges robust virtue epistemology, i.e. those views 
that attempt to “exclusively analyse knowledge in terms of a true belief that 
is the product of epistemically virtuous belief-forming process” (38). Can 
you briefly tell us what are the limits of robust virtue epistemology and how 
your anti-luck virtue epistemology goes beyond them? 
 
DP: It’s interesting that whereas in Epistemic Luck my account of 
knowledge and my response to radical scepticism went hand-in hand, in 
subsequent work I saw the virtue of keeping them apart. In particular, I 
don’t think that we need to offer a complete theory of knowledge in order to 
resolve the sceptical problem – indeed, my response to the sceptical prob-
lem in Epistemic Angst doesn’t appeal to any specific theory of knowledge. 
Moreover, one doesn’t need to resolve the sceptical problem in order to of-
fer a complete theory of knowledge (as The Nature and Value of Knowledge 
attests, as it hardly mentions the sceptical problem).  
The backdrop of my defence of anti-luck virtue epistemology was my 
desire to somehow make the kind of robust virtue epistemology – as defend-
ed by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Linda Zagzebski and others – into a defensi-
ble position. I really liked the elegance of this proposal, and in particular 
how it seemed to offer a very straightforward account of the value of 
knowledge in terms of knowledge being a particularly cognitive kind of 
achievement, but the more I examined the view the more I came to realise 
that it simply wasn’t tenable. In a nutshell, robust virtue epistemology un-
derstands knowledge as being a cognitive success that is primarily attributa-
ble to cognitive ability (which in turn generates the analogy with achieve-
ments, since they are plausibly to be understood as success that is primarily 
attributable to ability). The problem such a proposal faces is that it cannot 
account for a phenomenon that I refer to as epistemic dependence. This con-
cerns the way in which whether one’s cognitive success amounts to 
knowledge can significantly depend upon factors outwith one’s cognitive 
agency.  
Michel Croce – Conversation with Duncan Pritchard 
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	     
  
Epistemic dependence has both a positive and a negative aspect. Posi-
tive epistemic dependence is when one exhibits a level of cognitive agency 
that would not normally be sufficient for knowledge, but one counts as 
knowing regardless because of factors outwith one’s cognitive agency. Neg-
ative epistemic dependence, in contrast, is when one exhibits a level of cog-
nitive agency that would normally easily suffice for knowledge, but one 
does not count as knowing due to factors outwith one’s cognitive agency.  
A good example of the former are testimonial cases where one for the 
most part trusts the word of an informant, in an environment that is epistem-
ically friendly. Mere gullibility is never a route to knowledge (contra Lack-
ey, for example, I don’t think that one can gain testimonial knowledge 
merely by believing an informant, no matter how friendly the environment), 
but crucially in the right epistemic conditions one can gain testimonial 
knowledge by exhibiting very little by way of cognitive agency (e.g., just by 
being reasonably discriminating about who one would ask, and what one 
would believe). Such knowledge is not primarily attributable to one’s cogni-
tive agency, however, but if anything to one’s informant’s cognitive agency 
(or, if you like, the ‘cognitive whole’ of subject-and-informant).  
A good example of the latter are cases of purely environmental epistem-
ic luck. I introduced this distinction to enable me to contrast standard cases 
of veritic epistemic luck that involve something intervening between belief 
and fact (intervening epistemic luck, as I call it), and those cases of veritic 
epistemic luck where the luck in play is purely environmental, and nothing 
intervenes. Setting aside specifically epistemic cases for a moment, we can 
see this distinction in play across a range of scenarios. Imagine first a skilful 
archer who fires her arrow at the target and who hits the target, but where 
the reason she hits the target is that a dog has jumped up mid-flight, caught 
the arrow and placed it in the target. This would be a case of intervening 
luck, where the agent’s success is such that it could have easily been a fail-
ure due to something intervening to ensure the success. Contrast this case 
with one where nothing gets in the way, but the archer is skilfully firing her 
arrow in an environment where conditions are such that it is nonetheless still 
the case that her success could very easily have been a failure (e.g., a dog 
very narrowly failed to catch the arrow mid-flight, and had he caught it he 
would have run off with the bolt). This would be a case of purely environ-
mental luck. A case of environmental epistemic luck would be a barn façade 
scenario, where the agent really is seeing a genuine barn before her, but 
happens to be in barn façade county where most of the things that look like 
barns are nothing of the kind (such that her cognitive success could easily 
have been a cognitive failure).  
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Crucially, however, cases of environmental luck are such that the sub-
ject’s success is primarily attributable to her agency – think, for example, of 
the archer just noted who successfully hits the target without any interfer-
ence, but whose bolt could have easily been taken by the dog. This means 
that cases of environmental epistemic luck ought to count as knowledge too, 
and yet since they are also cases of veritic epistemic luck that’s not very 
plausible (and if you think that it is plausible, see what I say about epistemic 
risk below). Moreover, although various people have tried to get out of this 
problem by tweaking the robust virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, I’ve 
since argued, in a joint paper with Jesper Kallestrup («Virtue Epistemology 
and Epistemic Twin Earth», European Journal of Philosophy (2014)), that 
such tweaks are ultimately hopeless. In particular, even if we keep fixed 
everything that might remotely be relevant to an attribution of cognitive 
agency, one can still generate cases of positive epistemic dependence via 
appeal to environmental epistemic luck, and so robust virtue epistemology is 
untenable. 
Moreover, notice that these two objections to robust virtue epistemolo-
gy – via cases of positive and negative epistemic dependence – are particu-
larly problematic for the view in that they pull the position in two opposing 
directions. In order to deal with positive epistemic dependence, the tempta-
tion is to raise the bar for knowledge in order to exclude cases of environ-
mental epistemic luck. But in order to deal with negative epistemic depend-
ence, the temptation is to lower the bar, in order to allow for knowledge to 
be had in epistemically friendly environments even though very little cogni-
tive agency is on display. Put the two objections together, and the position is 
pulled asunder.  
That’s the negative story, but there’s also a positive story to tell as well. 
Although I was very disappointed to find that I couldn’t make robust virtue 
epistemology work, it dawned on me that the source of the problem here 
was a failure to recognise that knowledge is in fact answering to two dis-
tinct, albeit overlapping, considerations. The first is the need to eliminate 
high levels of epistemic luck (or, as I put it these days, high levels of epis-
temic risk). The second is the need to accommodate the sense in which 
when one knows it is down to one’s cognitive agency, in some significant 
way, that one is cognitively successful. These intuitions can look like two 
sides of the same coin, in that what it usually takes for one’s cognitive suc-
cess to be a manifestation of one’s cognitive agency is that it be non-lucky, 
and what it usually takes for one’s cognitive success to be non-lucky is that 
it is a manifestation of one’s cognitive agency. But while they overlap, they 
are not the identical. Indeed, I argue that they come apart in both directions, 
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in that there can be cases where the cognitive success is non-lucky in ways 
that have nothing to do with one’s manifestation of cognitive agency, and 
there can be cases where the cognitive success is primarily attributable to 
one’s cognitive agency and yet is nonetheless a matter of luck (environmen-
tal epistemic luck is a case in point on the latter front). Once we recognise 
this point, we realise that what we are really after is not a theory of 
knowledge that exclusively understands knowledge in terms of the exclu-
sion of epistemic luck or in terms of the manifestation of cognitive agency, 
but rather a proposal that can accommodate both constraints and how they 
intersect. I call the resulting proposal anti-luck (/risk) virtue epistemology. 
Roughly, it holds that knowledge is a safe cognitive success where the safe-
ty of one’s cognitive success is at least significantly (but need not be primar-
ily) attributable to one’s manifestation of cognitive agency. I argue that this 
is a complete theory of knowledge, in that it is able to deal with all the prob-
lem cases. It also casts light on a number of interesting issues in epistemol-
ogy, such as the relationship between knowledge and cognitive achieve-
ments, the relationship between knowledge and understanding, the relation-
ship between propositional knowledge and ability knowledge, the value of 
knowledge, and so on.  
 
11. Two of the several externally funded Eidyn research projects you lead as 
Director of this research centre based in Edinburgh are about the virtue of 
intellectual humility. What did you discover about intellectual humility 
through these projects? And why is this non-classical virtue becoming so 
important nowadays?  
 
DP: One thing I discovered in engaging with all this wonderful new work on 
intellectual humility is that my conception of it is largely at odds with eve-
ryone else’s. In particular, I think it is standard to regard intellectual humili-
ty as at least involving some kind of ownership of one’s intellectual limita-
tions, and possibly even having a downgraded conception of one’s intellec-
tual abilities. I think the latter is completely at odds with intellectual humili-
ty being an intellectual virtue (which I think it is), since I don’t think intel-
lectual virtues can essentially involve inaccuracy. But the former is also 
problematic. In particular, I hold that intellectual humility is best character-
ised in terms of having certain other-regarding – better, other-respecting –
dispositions, and not in terms of some sort of distinctive attitude that one 
takes to oneself and one’s intellectual abilities. For example, it consists in a 
willingness to listen carefully to others, to think about what they have to 
say, to present one’s reasons and listen to their counterarguments, and so on.  
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This conception of intellectual humility has important ramifications for 
a number of debates, not least the debates about the epistemology of disa-
greement. It is often taken as given in these debates that if one, on reflec-
tion, responds to a disagreement with one’s epistemic peers by sticking to 
one’s opinions, then one is thereby being dogmatic, and hence lacking in in-
tellectual humility. But I don’t think that this follows at all. If one reflects 
on the matter and one is genuinely convinced, then I think one owes it to 
oneself to maintain one’s opinions. But that’s entirely compatible with being 
intellectually humble, since on my view that is about manifesting certain 
other-respecting dispositions towards one’s disputant, and not in terms of 
any distinctive attitude one takes to one’s own beliefs. (And note that these 
dispositions must really be rooted in a respect for others – merely going 
through the motions of respecting another’s point of view is not sufficient). 
More generally, I think this conception of intellectual humility is very im-
portant to public debate. We need to learn how to respect others – where I 
think this is ultimately rooted in a genuine care for other people – while also 
recognising that this is entirely compatible with one having genuine convic-
tions (e.g., political, ethical, etc).   
 
12. We haven’t talked about your work in applied epistemology so far, but I 
think it’s important that the readers of APhEx get to know about what you 
and other members of Eidyn are doing in this field. As Director of this re-
search centre, could you tell us a bit about the projects and the activities 
hosted by Eidyn? You are also doing research in sub-fields such as social 
epistemology, epistemology of education, legal epistemology. What are the 
prospects for applied epistemology? 
 
DP: One of the distinctive features of Eidyn is its commitment to outreach 
and, relatedly, to developing impact from the research projects that we host. 
We’ve had a lot of success on this front, and it’s something that I’m very 
proud of. Since you ask about applied epistemology in particular, let me tell 
you about one specific project that we’ve run which is devoted to transform-
ing prison education (see http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk/project/philosophy-
prisons). This involved collaboration with the Scottish Prison Service and 
colleagues at New College Lanarkshire and the University of Edinburgh’s 
Moray House School of Education. The goal was to run a study that ex-
plored how the teaching of philosophy in prisons could help develop prison-
ers’ intellectual character (drawing on, in the process, some work I’ve done 
on the role of intellectual virtues in educational contexts). To this end we 
used an off-line version of Eidyn’s very popular Introduction to Philosophy 
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MOOC (= massive open online course) and a particular pedagogical ap-
proach to teaching philosophy known as Community of Philosophical In-
quiry, or CoPI for short. Throughout the study we were looking for signs of 
the development of intellectual character, such as the manifestation of par-
ticular cognitive traits – for example, intellectual tenacity, creativity in prob-
lem-solving, the ability to articulate one’s reasoning, responsiveness to the 
reasons offered by others, and so on. The results were far more impressive 
than we could have hoped, as there was clear evidence that the prisoners not 
only developed their intellectual characters, but that they also developed 
important social and interpersonal skills (e.g., self-esteem and respect for 
others). This is a good example not just of applied epistemology, but also 
impact, in that this project has transformed the provision of prison education 
in at least two prisons in Scotland, with scope to eventually change prison 
education across the sector (there are plans for follow-up projects aimed at 
achieving just that).  
The foregoing in itself offers a flavour of why one might profit from 
engaging in applied epistemology. But even where there is no obvious im-
pact of this kind, I still think that applied epistemology is worth exploring. 
In particular, it is very useful to take general ideas in epistemology and see 
how they play out within an applied domain. Recently, for example, I’ve 
been taking my new work on epistemic risk (described below) and applying 
it to two issues in the philosophy of law, concerning the notion of legal evi-
dence and the question of how much legal error is compatible with a just le-
gal system. I’ve also been doing a lot of work on the epistemology of educa-
tion, such as concerning what the epistemic goals of education are, and how 
the intellectual virtues figure in those goals (this work obviously connects 
with the philosophy in prisons project just described). And I have an on-
going interest in trying to work out how general themes in epistemology 
play out within the specific domain of religious belief. In all these cases I 
think one’s understanding of both the specific domain in question and of 
epistemology in general is enhanced, in that the flow of understanding goes 
in both directions. This why when I teach epistemology I increasingly try to 
bring in at least some applied element into the discussion, in order to get 
students to see that epistemology isn’t just about dealing with radical scep-
tics or defining knowledge, but can also be about something as practical as 
how to understand legal evidence. 
 
13. And what about the completed project on Extended Knowledge? It 
sounds as it is a great interdisciplinary topic, involving general epistemolo-
gy, social epistemology and philosophy of mind. 
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DP: The basic idea behind Eidyn’s Extended Knowledge project was to sys-
tematically explore – incredibly, for the first time – the epistemological 
ramifications of the extended cognition programme in the cognitive sciences 
(see http://eidyn.ppls.ed.ac.uk/project/extended-knowledge-2013-15-0). Ed-
inburgh was the ideal place to host such a project, given that our own Andy 
Clark has been the leading figure when it comes to work on extended cogni-
tion. I wrote what I think is the very first paper exploring the epistemologi-
cal implications of extended cognition («Cognitive Ability and the Extended 
Cognition Thesis», Synthese  (2010)), but since then the floodgates have 
opened on this score, largely due to our very successful project. In particu-
lar, we didn’t just examine the epistemological ramifications of a technolog-
ical or environmental cognitive extension, but also the possibility of group, 
or social, cognition. The result has been a wealth of publications, not least a 
very long survey paper written by myself and my collaborators on the pro-
ject (‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Paler-
mos), Philosophical Issues (2014)), and two volumes of papers, containing a 
range of interdisciplinary perspectives on the issues, that are forthcoming 
with Oxford UP (Extended Epistemology and Socially Extended Epistemol-
ogy).  
 
14.  Before concluding this interview with a few curiosities, let me ask you 
what are you working on at the moment. I saw that you recently published 
on the topic of epistemic risk («Epistemic Risk», Journal of Philosophy 
(forthcoming)). What is epistemic risk? What’s the relationship between 
luck and risk in your view? 
 
DP: When I first started developing my anti-luck epistemology methodolo-
gy as part of Epistemic Luck, I was proceeding on the basis that there must 
be a philosophical account of the nature of luck out there. To my surprise, 
there wasn’t, in that it was mostly just treated as an undefined primitive. 
This is particularly remarkable given that the notion appears across a num-
ber of philosophical debates, such metaphysics (e.g., causation), political 
philosophy (e.g., just deserts), ethics (e.g., moral luck), and epistemology 
(e.g., epistemic luck). Usually philosophers cannot help but define every-
thing, so it’s surprising to see that they let this one slip through the net. On 
the plus side, however, it turned out that there was a wealth of interesting 
empirical work on luck and risk ascriptions that was helpful to developing 
my own account of luck, which ended up going down modal lines. In Epis-
temic Luck, I put the material on risk to one side, as I tended to assume, in 
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common with the empirical literature, that the differences weren’t that im-
portant (the folk often tend to run these notions together, which is why they 
tend to appear side-by side in the empirical literature).  
A few years ago, however, I came to realise that the differences be-
tween luck and risk were more significant than I previously thought, and in 
fact could help me resolve some problems with my theory of knowledge. 
There was one lacuna in my theory of knowledge in particular that always 
bugged me. According to my modal theory of luck, lucky events are, rough-
ly, those events that obtain in the actual world but which could easily have 
not obtained (i.e., which obtain in close possible worlds, where the initial 
conditions for the target event are kept fixed). When I plugged this into an 
anti-luck epistemology, I drew the consequence that a true belief that was 
not subject to veritic epistemic luck would not just be true in the actual 
world, but would continue to be true across close possible worlds where the 
belief continues to be formed on the same basis as in the actual world (the 
belief is thus safe, to use the common parlance, though note that anti-luck 
epistemology generates a particularly rendering of safety). But that’s not 
quite licensed by the theory of luck in play. Strictly speaking, a true belief 
would be veritically lucky if either one formed a false belief on the same 
basis in close possible worlds, or one failed to form a true belief on the 
same basis in close possible worlds (both eventualities, after all, are “non-
obtainings of the target event”). Crucially, the second kind of eventuality 
doesn’t seem to be at all incompatible with knowledge, in the way that ver-
itic epistemic luck is. In Epistemic Luck, I convinced myself that this wasn’t 
an issue because of the basis-relativity involved, in that provided we kept 
the basis fixed then there ought not to be case where the second eventuality 
can in practice come apart from the first eventuality. But still it bugged me, 
and bugged me even more once I started to think of cases that would exploit 
this loophole.  
Oddly, no-one else spotted this lacuna, though I expected someone to. 
This meant that I was grappling with a problem for my view that only I rec-
ognised as a problem, which is rather unusual. More recently, I’ve come to 
realise that there was a second unmotivated aspect of my anti-luck episte-
mology, which was the way that I dealt with safe beliefs in necessary propo-
sitions. Necessary propositions are thought to be a problem for safety-style 
views because if one happens on a belief in a necessary proposition, no mat-
ter how epistemically suspect the basis for belief is, then of course there are 
no possible worlds, close or otherwise, where one forms the belief on the 
same basis and ends up with a false belief (so the belief is safe by default). 
My solution to this, which I thought fell-out of my anti-luck epistemology 
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methodology, was to insist that what we are interested in is the doxastic 
output of a certain actual basis for belief. So while this might lead to the be-
lief that p in the actual world, we shouldn’t just focus on close possible 
worlds where the subject continues to believe that p on the same basis, but 
rather close possible worlds where that same basis leads to belief (whether p 
or otherwise). In this way, we can explain why, for example, tossing a coin 
is not a route to safe belief that 2+2=4, for although there is no close possi-
ble world where one falsely believes that proposition on the same basis, 
there are close possible worlds where the same basis leads to false belief 
(e.g., that 2+2=5). Such a manoeuvre seems very sensible, but why is it mo-
tivated by the modal account of luck? That is far from obvious. After all, the 
modal account of luck just talks about the non-obtaining of the target event, 
and doesn’t place any further restrictions on what counts as a lucky event.  
Focussing on risk, specifically, helps us to resolve these problems, and 
in a principled way. It also helps us to better deal with some other challeng-
es to the view. There are a number of key differences between luck and risk. 
Here are three. First, luck has a bivalence that risk tends to lack, in that luck 
can be both good and bad, but risk is usually (though not always) bad. Se-
cond, when we make evaluations of risk we pick out a specific risk event. In 
boarding a plane, for example, the risk event might be crashing, or hitting 
turbulence, or having a panic attack mid-flight, and so on. What risk event 
we focus on determines the level of risk in play (perhaps the panic attack is 
high risk, since this is an event which is modally close, but the plane crash-
ing is low risk, since this is an event that isn’t modally close). Luck lacks 
this feature, in that ascriptions of luck usually just get us to focus on what is 
happening with regard to the target actual event in the modal environment. 
Finally, third, luck is essentially backwards-looking, while risk is essentially 
forwards-looking. Suppose you narrowly avoid being hit by a sniper’s bul-
let. Looking backwards, you will say that you were lucky to be alive. Look-
ing forwards, you will say that you were at high risk of being hit by the bul-
let.  
The most significant of these differences when it comes to resolving the 
lacunas in anti-luck epistemology is the second. The point is that we need a 
modal account of risk, one that is applied, in the epistemic case, such that 
the target risk event is the formation of false belief on the same basis. With 
that in place, we can now explain why mere non-belief in the target proposi-
tion on the same basis wouldn’t count as knowledge-undermining epistemic 
risk, since it doesn’t concern the relevant risk event. Moreover, we can mo-
tivate the manoeuvre introduced to deal with safe belief in necessary propo-
sitions. For notice that our natural formulation of the risk event does not 
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trade specifically on the proposition actually believed, but rather concerns 
any belief that results from that same basis.  
The move to an anti-risk epistemology also has other advantages. Re-
cently it has become fashionable to argue that lucky knowledge might not 
be so bad – perhaps we do have some bona fide knowledge that is subject to 
veritic epistemic luck? I don’t share this intuition, but I can at least see that 
there seems nothing obviously contradictory about lucky knowledge. Things 
change, however, once we put the emphasis on risk. Can we really make 
sense of the idea of genuine knowledge that is subject to a high degree of 
epistemic risk? That certainly does sound contradictory. Moreover, our ac-
count of luck and risk and how they relate to one another presents us with a 
diagnosis of why we have tended, post-Gettier, to focus on knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck rather than epistemic risk. A key feature of Get-
tier-style cases, after all, is that the belief in question is granted as being 
true. This naturally prompts us to take a backwards-looking approach to the 
issue, and hence employ the language of epistemic luck. But we could just 
as easily have taken a forwards-looking approach and dealt instead in terms 
of epistemic risk. Moreover, I contend that it is the notion of epistemic risk 
that has the whip-hand here, in that we only care about the elimination of 
high levels of epistemic luck because we care about the elimination of high 
levels of epistemic risk, rather than vice versa. We were thus wrong to have 
fixated so much on epistemic luck, and in particular to have fixated on this 
notion at the expense of the more fundamental epistemological notion of ep-
istemic risk. We thus move from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk 
epistemology, and more generally from an account of knowledge in terms of 
anti-luck virtue epistemology to one that is an anti-risk virtue epistemology. 
Incidentally, I think the modal account of risk that I defend has lots to 
offer to a number of philosophically important debates. For one thing, I 
think it is far preferable to the probabilistic account of risk that is dominant 
in the literature. But it can also cast light on problems that arise in a range of 
domains beyond epistemology, such as law (e.g., disputes about legal evi-
dence) and aesthetics. I now have a bunch of papers on the modal account of 
risk and its applications, and I suspect there are many more applications that 
I simply haven’t foreseen yet.  
 
15. Any other preview of forthcoming projects? 
 
DP: Right now I’m working on a backlog of commissioned papers that 
built-up when I was trying to finish Epistemic Angst. Once the backlog is 
cleared, then I’m not sure where I will go next. In fact, this is kind of excit-
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ing, as it is the first time in my career where I’ve finished a monograph and 
not already been under contract for the next monograph! At one point I did 
have a rather nutty idea of trying to write a book that weaves all of my work 
in epistemology together within a single volume. The idea was to start with 
meta-epistemological issues (e.g., epistemological methodology, radical 
scepticism, etc), then turn to normative epistemology (e.g., theory of 
knowledge, epistemic axiology, etc), and then close with applied epistemol-
ogy that put the ideas previously set out into action within a specific domain 
(e.g., epistemology of law, epistemology of education, etc). Half in jest, this 
had a working title of “Epistemic Panorama”. I now think that such a book 
would be absurdly ambitious, not least because it would be monumentally 
long. In terms of other projects, I would like to write something that brings 
together my ideas on risk and luck in one place (this would be my first 
monograph that doesn’t have a primarily epistemic focus). I probably also 
have a book in me on the epistemology of religious belief too, a topic that I 
keep returning to at regular intervals. I’d also like to write something on ap-
plied epistemology. Another idea I’ve been mulling over for some time is to 
do something on the meaning of life (and in particular the role of philosoph-
ical paradoxes in this regard). So I’ve lots of vague ideas of where I might 
go next, but no clear path as yet, which suits me just fine right now. 
 
16. Here are my three final and straightforward curiosities. The first is a 
brutal thought experiment. I hope you don’t mind playing this game for a 
second. Suppose that today you can select within your philosophical pro-
duction one work that would become a milestone for future generations of 
philosophers and philosophy students, whereas the rest of your production 
will be lost. (In your case, the problem is not very serious, as your books are 
already extremely popular and discussed all over the world.) But suppose 
for a moment that you can save only one article or book. Which one would 
you pick? 
 
DP: I guess it would have to be Epistemic Angst, since that’s the book I’m 
most proud of, and it does constitute a philosophical labour of love that 
takes me right from my first engagement with philosophy to my current 
work. (It would be a pain for my work on anti-luck/risk virtue epistemology 
– and the wider work that supports this view – to be lost though, as that’s 
the other philosophical contribution that I’m particularly proud of).    
 
17. Second curiosity, I bet a far easier one. Could you share with the read-
ers of APhEx the titles of the three books that have most radically influenced 
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your philosophy? And could you tell us which philosophers, mentors or 
scholars – among the ones you’ve worked with – have been crucial for your 
research? 
 
DP: My writings on radical scepticism have been very much informed by 
two books: Barry Stroud’s The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism, 
and Michael Williams’s Unnatural Doubts. My work in epistemology in 
general owes an enormous debt to the incredible body of work produced by 
Ernie Sosa (I wouldn’t want to pick a particular book, since it is the body of 
work as a whole that has exerted the influence). Indeed, Ernie isn’t just an 
intellectual influence on me, due to his writing, but also a personal influ-
ence, as I think he is an exemplar for others to follow in the profession, with 
his modesty, his intellectual generosity, and his general virtue, intellectual 
and otherwise. One doesn’t have to be wise to write important works on the 
nature of wisdom, but Ernie has the rare distinction of both being wise and 
making a distinctive contribution to the debate about wisdom. If only more 
of the leading philosophers in our profession could be more like Ernie!   
 
18.  Finally. What would you suggest to young scholars in philosophy, who 
often have to balance their passion for philosophical questions with the dif-
ficulty of starting a degree in a discipline that is undervalued in many coun-
tries? 
 
DP: As I mentioned earlier, I count my lucky stars that I somehow made it 
as a professional philosopher. Even quite late in the day I thought that it 
couldn’t happen, and I didn’t really have a plan B in my back pocket if 
things didn’t work out (except that I knew that under no circumstances 
would I return to Wolverhampton in that case; I think emigration would 
have likely been on the cards). My hurdle was class, but there are many oth-
er hurdles (disability, race, gender, ageism and so on, and of course many 
people face several hurdles of this kind). So it’s not going to be easy for 
many people, if anyone. That said, for what it is worth, I think the current 
pessimism about careers in philosophy is not particularly evidence-based. 
Many philosophy departments in the UK, for example, have massively ex-
panded in the last couple of decades, as Universities have opened their eyes 
to how cost-effective it can be to have a world-class philosophy department 
(no need for expensive labs for one thing!). I also think there are academic 
jobs out there that simply didn’t exist before, such as posts at the intersec-
tion of academia and administration which explore such things as develop-
ing impact of research, or promoting outreach. My guess is that such posts 
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will proliferate in the coming years, and that philosophers will be well-
placed to occupy them. (As noted above, I also think that working on impact 
of research is perfectly intellectually respectable thing to do. It’s not for eve-
ryone, of course, but that’s consistent with it being a worthwhile thing for 
some philosophers to engage in). Moreover, philosophers are increasingly 
engaging in interdisciplinary research. While obviously this doesn’t suit all 
philosophical inquiries, when one is able to conduct projects along these 
lines then it obviously opens up further possibilities for employment post-
PhD. Finally, one thing I tell my PhD students is that what will ultimately 
ensure that you make it in academia is publications in very good journals 
(you don’t need lots; indeed, a couple in the very best journals is much bet-
ter than half a dozen all in weaker journals). If you can publish well, then 
you have a decent shot at an academic career, and given that being paid to 
do philosophy is a marvellous thing, a decent shot is probably enough to 
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